This article examines whether enhanced corporate governance, auditing by one of the Big Four and auditors' opinions, are associated with the propensity to engage in earnings management through accounting choices or operational decisions in Brazil.
Introduction
Most research indicates that discretionary accruals are the main mechanism employed by accountants and managers to manage earnings. Examples are McNichols & Wilson (1988) ; Jones (1991) ; Dechow, Sloan & Sweeney (1995) ; Kang & Sivaramakrishnan (1995) ; Martinez (2001) ; Fuji (2004) , Tukamoto (2005) ; and Almeida et al. (2005) . Irrespective of the methodological focus (discretionary accruals or descriptive-inferential statistics), all these authors have investigated the manipulation of accounting numbers through accounting choices. In contrast, there are very few works in the international literature examining earnings management through operational decisions, and none for Brazil.
Of these few studies of manipulation of accounting figures through operational decisions, the standouts are Roychowdhury (2003 and ; Gunny (2005) and Zang (2005) . These authors variously call this practice "earnings management through real activities manipulation" (Roychowdhury, 2005) , "real earnings management" (Gunny, 2005) or "real manipulation" (Zang, 2005) . Here we use earnings management through operational decisions.
Strictly speaking, Roychowdhury (2005, p. 3) defines making operational decisions to manipulate accounting figures as "departures from normal operational practices, motivated by managers' desire to mislead at least some stakeholders into believing certain financial reporting goals have been met in the normal course of operations" (underscoring added). Roychowdhury (2005) sought to identify whether firms make certain operational decisions (related to sales, level of output and timing of discretionary expenses) to manipulate accounting numbers to avoid reporting losses. In turn, Gunny (2005) aimed to identify the consequences of operational decisions to manipulate earnings, that is, she investigated whether these decisions affect the ability to generate cash flow and earnings in future periods, as well as if analysts perceive these manipulations. Finally, Zang (2005) used a framework based on cost-benefit analysis to identify whether firms with less flexible accounting practices (subject to stricter accounting regulation) make operational decisions to manipulate accounting information more than do other firms.
She also investigated the order (timing and intensity) between the two forms of manipulating accounting numbers -operational decisions and accounting decisions.
In this work we use our own models to infer earnings management by accounting choices and operational decisions, to investigate whether Brazilian companies listed in the Novo Mercado segment of the São Paulo Stock Exchange (Bovespa) and audited by the Big Four manage earnings through these two procedures.
Additionally, we analyze whether firms that manage earnings through discretionary accruals also make operational decisions for the same purpose.
The evidence obtained from our sample of firms suggests that those listed in the Novo Mercado segment and audited by the Big Four have lower propensity to manage their earnings by accounting choices. However, on the matter of earnings management through operational decisions, the results indicate that except in special cases, listing in the Novo Mercado and being audited by one of the Big Four does not discourage earnings management.
Research Hypotheses
The main objective of this study is to identify the factors that affect the practice of earnings management both by accounting choices and operational decisions. In Brazil, previous authors have employed discretionary accruals models -both general models (Martinez, 2001; Tukamoto, 2005) and models of specific accounts (Fuji, 2004) -and frequency distribution analysis (Cardoso, 2005) , but there have yet to be any works on real manipulation or economic earnings management. With this study we hope to contribute to the understanding of earnings management so that in the near future it will be possible to develop a theory able to understand its incentives and counter-incentives, mechanisms and consequences.
In recent years the Brazilian and international academic literature has shown growing interest in corporate governance. A question that arises is whether listing in the Novo Mercado segment of the Bovespa, which requires meeting enhanced corporate governance standards, is a factor that minimizes both types of earnings management.
Therefore, we formulated the following research hypothesis: In the final analysis, the service of independent auditors is for the benefit of the shareholders, as an instrument to monitor managers. Although auditing is unquestionably important, it also must be recognized that in certain situations the relations between auditing firms and their clients' shareholders can create an agency conflict. While audit firms should above all heed the interests of the shareholders, they are also concerned with maximizing their utility to management.
In this context, auditing firms worry about losing their clients and the respective revenue. This problem can be more serious for smaller auditing firms, since the importance of the revenue from a particular client will likely be greater. In cases of accounting problems it is much more likely that a large auditor will have greater independence to question the financial statements and accounting practices than will a small audit firm. Boynton et al. (2002) mentioned that independence is the basis of the auditing profession, in the sense that the auditor must be disinterested, and hence objective, in relation to the company audited. This fairness is the very essence of auditing and the basis for public trust in the role of auditors.
Many studies have utilized the name of the auditing firm as a proxy for the quality of the auditing performed and have examined the association between this identity and the quality of the results (Becker et al. 1998; Almeida, 2007) . Some researchers (Beasley & Petroni, 2001 ) have raised hypotheses, besides the name of the auditing firm, of whether specialization in the auditing field has a positive effect on the credibility offered by the auditor.
Based on these considerations, we also formulated the following research hypothesis: Another reasonable expectation is that when the auditors' opinion contains reservations, this indicates the company is managing its earnings, suggesting the following hypothesis.
H3: An auditors' opinion with reservations is an indicator of earnings management through accounting or operational decisions.
Research Methodology
This section presents the econometric models used and the sample studied. SG&A t = selling, general and administrative expenses in year t; S t = net sales revenue in year t; DS t = a dummy variable indicating the behavior of net sales revenue, which is 1 when S t < S t-1 , and 0 otherwise.
Econometric models
In this model, the coefficients α 2 and α 4 are expected to be positive because changes in SG&A normally accompany sales (S); the coefficient α 3 is expected to be negative because SG&A should tend to remain constant over the short run; and the coefficient α 5 is expected to be positive, reflecting reversion of SG&A over the long run.
The residual of equation (1) (1) is in logarithmic form, so it is necessary to transform it, as suggested by Zang (2005, p. 9, footnote 8) -equation (2):
This residual is then multiplied by -1 and divided by the value of the firm's total assets in the previous period (A t-1 ).
From a technical standpoint, the greater the value of Ab_SGA, the higher the probability that the firm is reducing its selling, general and administrative overhead to increase its profit. In other words, companies with positive Ab_SGA are likelier to be making operational decisions to increase their income, while those with negative Ab_SGA are doing the same to decrease their income.
We investigate hypothesis (H1b) by using the model developed by 
where:
Prod t = COGS t + ∆Inventories t ;
Prod t = Production costs in year t;
COGS t = Cost of goods sold in year t; S t = net sales revenue in year t;
∆S t = S t -S t-1 .
All the coefficients are expected to be positive, because the higher a firm's sales are, the greater its production costs will be.
The residual of equation (3) represents the level of abnormal production costs (Ab_Prod), indicating that the firm is manipulating earnings through operational decisions related to the level of production. An abnormal increase in production should reduce unit production costs, given that fixed costs would be distributed over a greater number of units. As long as the reduction in fixed overhead per unit is not exceeded by the marginal cost per unit, the total cost per unit will fall. This situation would lead to a lower cost of goods sold, affecting the earnings in the period.
The model also serves to detect possible manipulation by increasing sales through abnormal discounts. This functionality allows applying the model to any type of firm, whether engaged in manufacturing, services or commerce, as argued by Roychowdhury (2005) .
In this context, a positive Ab_Prod indicates a higher probability that the firm is managing its earnings to increase income, while a negative Ab_Prod indicates a higher probability that it is doing the same to decrease its income.
To analyze the hypothesis (H2) it is first necessary to identify discretionary accruals. We do this by applying the KS model, formulated by Kang & Sivaramakrishnan (1995) -equation (4) .
AT x c xExp xPPE
Ta it = Total accruals = (ΔNWC -depreciation and amortization);
Rev it = Net revenue Exp it = Operational costs and expenses before depreciation and amortization; NWC = Net working capital, excluding cash and cash equivalents and short-term loans;
FA it = Fixed assets; δ 1 = AR i,t-1 /Rev it , δ 2 = (CGL -CR i,t-1 )/Exp i,t-1 e δ 3 = Depr i,t-1 /FA i,t-1 ; AR i,t-1 = Accounts receivable in period t-1;
Depr it = Depreciation and amortization expenses in period t;
TA it ,ReV it ,Exp it and FA it are computed in terms of Total Assets at t-1 (A t-1 ).
The discretionary accruals (Ab_Acc) are computed as the residual of equation 4, as follows -equation (5):
Ab Acc AT x c xExp xPPE
Conceptually, a positive value of Ab_Acc means the firm is managing its earnings to increase them, while a negative value means it is doing so to reduce them. The models to estimate "normal" levels of operating expenses and production costs were computed in cross-section by sector for the period from 1998 to 2005. The values reported represent the average coefficients between the industry-year and the t-statistics of the standard errors, according to the procedure developed by Fama & Macbeth (1973) . The regressions by sector are an essential requirement for the quality of the estimates, given the specificities of each industry. Because of the need to work with sectors, it was necessary to exclude those without sufficient data for a robust regression.
Research sample and estimates of the earnings management proxies
In this context, we excluded from the analysis firms engaged in the software development and data processing sectors. Our definition of sectors followed that established by Economática.
To calculate the empirical proxy for earnings management by accruals, we estimated the KS model using instrumental variables, with the independent variables lagged by one period as the instruments. Calculation of a regression in two stages with instruments is a requirement to deal with the problem of simultaneity: since in the estimation of traditional accruals models (Jones and modified Jones), both the explanatory and explained variables are determined together, this causes autocorrelation problems that bias the results.
The statistics from the regressions in general showed good results, comparable with those reported in the works of Gunny (2005) and Zang (2005) . From the inferred coefficients it was possible to identify for each company-year the levels of abnormal selling, general and administrative expenses (Ab_SGA), abnormal production expenses (Ab_Prod) and abnormal discretionary accruals (Ab_Acc). We first carried out tests to verify the difference between the empirical proxies of earnings management and of companies listed in the Novo Mercado companies, on the one hand, and between earnings management and firms with shares traded in either Levels 1 or 2 or the Novo Mercado segments of the Bovespa on the other hand. Table 2 shows the main results. Panel a) indicates that the companies are different in average terms in all the empirical proxies for earnings management, both those based on accounting choices and operational decisions. Firms listed in the Novo Mercado manage earnings less both through accounting choices and operational decisions.
In Panel b) we performed parametric tests of differences of means to check whether these are consistent. These tests showed that the differences between companies in the Novo Mercado and other companies are significant only for earnings management through accounting choices. For the other metrics, the differences are not significant.
In Panel c) we applied the Mann-Whitney nonparametric test of the difference of means. The results show there are significant differences between the samples only for earnings management by discretionary accruals (accounting choices).
Therefore, the statistics indicate that being listed for trading in the Novo Mercado does reduce the propensity to manage earnings through accounting choices, but it does not discourage doing so through operational decisions. 
Analysis of the differences of means between companies audited by one of the Big Four and those audited by other firms
To check whether being audited by one of the Big Four reduces the propensity to manage earnings, we again tested the differences in means. The results are presented in Table 3 . confirm that only earnings management by accounting choices is discouraged by being audited by one of the Big Four.
The statistics therefore indicate that auditing by the Big Four reduces the propensity to manage earnings by accounting choices but not by operational decisions. Table 5 shows the pairwise Spearman correlations between the variables and the statistical significance in each case.
The analysis of the correlations between earnings management by operational decisions and accruals shows a positive and significant relation for Abs_SGA and
Abs_Acc. This implies that in the general sample, when a company is managing its earnings through manipulation of selling, general and administrative expenses, it is doing so in the same direction through accruals. For the sample as a whole, there was not significant correlation between Abs_Prod and Abs_Acc. There is a positive and significant correlation between receiving an opinion with reservations and both Abs_Acc and Abs_Prod. These results indicate that companies receiving reservations tend to manage earnings through accounting choices more actively, as well as being more likely to manage earnings through operational decisions linked to the level of production. 
Multivariate analysis
To check the nature of the relations between the variables, we performed regressions seeking to observe the behavior of the earnings management proxies in function of the various explanatory variables. For the regression analysis to explain Abs_SGA, we formulated the model shown in Table 7 , which through satisfactory statistics identifies a positive and significant relation between Abs_Prod and Abs_SGA. With respect to the control variables utilized, only Novo Mercado reduces the propensity of manage earnings by operational decisions with a level of significance lower than 10%.
The Auditing variable, although negative, does not reach the normal significance benchmark, at 10.6 %. The correlation between the Abs_SGA variable and receiving an auditors' opinion with reservations is in the expected direction, but only at 11.8% significance. Finally, Table 8 presents the results of the regression to explain Abs_Prod. Only receiving an opinion with reservations is significant to detect earnings management by operational choices related to production. Listing in the Novo Mercado, although having a correlation in the expected direction, is not sufficiently significant. This suggests that being listed for trading in the Novo Mercado and being audited by one of the Big Four firms is not a guarantee of lower propensity to manage earnings through operational decisions involving selling, general and administrative expenses. 
Final Considerations
In One of the negative consequences of earnings management is increased information asymmetry, because this behavior masks the company's real financial situation. Users of accounting information (investors, regulators, shareholders and analysts) can make decisions based on financial statements that do no depict the real situation.
The problem of earnings management is that it changes the risk perception of investors. If a firm manages it earnings upward, investors will be led to believe the firms is doing better than it really is. Firms can also manage earnings downward, to soften the volatility of returns and perhaps "save for a rainy day" so to speak, making an upwards adjustment easier in the future.
The upshot is that the earnings and other financial figures reported, while certainly having informational value, cannot be interpreted without a grain of salt. A case-by-case analysis is necessary to determine whether a firm is managing its earnings, and how and in what direction.
One of the difficulties of this type of research is the lack of available data to estimate discretionary accruals and the empirical proxies of earnings management through operational decisions. Another critical factor that influences analysis of earnings management is the heterogeneity of the sample, for instance if composed of commercial firms and financial institutions, which can cast doubt on the results.
